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WEAPONIZING THE EPA: PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL AND 
WICKED PROBLEMS 
CRAIG A. JONES* 
"Traditionally, it has been conservative Republicans who warned about the 
need to check the power of a president lest he become dictatorial, while 
liberal Democrats lobbied for a strong chief executive. Today the two 
camps essentially have switched sides."1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In its broadest sense, presidential control encompasses all the actions, in both 
word and deed, whereby presidents “go it alone” to adopt policies in the absence 
of congressional will to do so, and sometimes directly contrary to it. Such actions 
include using the “bully pulpit” of the executive office to rhetorically set the agenda, 
                                                          
 *  Craig Jones is a doctoral candidate in Boise State University’s School of Public Service and is 
on track to receive his PhD in Public Policy and Administration in spring 2020. The author would like to thank 
his family for their support and patience, his dissertation committee for their support and guidance, and 
especially his committee chair, Dr. Jen Schneider, whose support, encouragement, and mentorship have 
been invaluable. Finally, the author would like to thank the editors of the Idaho Law Review for their interest 
in this topic and dedication in preparing the article for publication. All errors in style or substance are entirely 
the author’s. 
 1. Gerald F. Seib, Presidential Power -- Limits of Power: Is President’s Authority Being Nibbled 
Away? Many in the GOP Say So ---  They Rebel as Congress Curbs Office in Numerous Ways; Democrats Scoff 
at Notion --- Cry of Remember Watergate, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter Limits of Power]. 
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frame issues, and mobilize the populace.2 They also include all the tools the unitary 
executive has at his or her disposal to set and shape policy, including, among other 
things, executive orders, budgets, presidential memoranda, signing statements, ap-
pointment powers, and agency rulemaking. And while partisan views on presiden-
tial power and prerogative shift over time, as the above quote indicates, the fact 
remains that all modern presidents utilize formal and informal power to their ad-
vantage. While the use or abuse of power is frequently in the eye of the partisan 
beholder,3 the tools of presidential control are valued by each modern executive 
entering the Oval Office. Thus, while perspectives on presidential control change 
with shifting political winds, campaign rhetoric notwithstanding, the practice of 
presidential control does not. 4 It is precisely this enduring presence that makes 
presidential control an important area of study. 
To be sure, presidential control has been extensively studied from various an-
gles in such diverse academic disciplines as public administration, public policy, po-
litical science, law, psychology, and communications. The attention by scholars is 
well deserved. Like few other actions by citizens and policymakers alike, the way in 
which presidential control is exercised can fundamentally shape the process by 
which polices are adopted and implemented. This has important implications for 
both governance and our foundational democratic principles. The aspects of presi-
dential control this study examines are the coordinated use of the bully pulpit and 
control of administrative agencies, respectively, to promote and adopt policies 
apart from congressional action. Thanks to existing scholarship, we know much 
about how presidents frequently act through administrative agencies in pursuit of 
policy goals—originally coined the “Administrative Presidency” by Richard Nathan.5 
                                                          
 2.  The term “bully pulpit” is attributed to Teddy Roosevelt who famously observed, “Most of 
us enjoy preaching, and I’ve got such a bully pulpit.” THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE WINNING OF THE WEST: AN 
ACCOUNT OF THE EXPLORATION AND SETTLEMENT OF OUR COUNTRY FROM THE ALLEGHENIES TO THE PACIFIC, at vi (1917); 
David Greenberg, Theodore Roosevelt and the Image of Presidential Activism, 78 JOHNS HOPKINS U. PRESS 
1057, 1067–68 (2011). The term “bully pulpit” is especially appropriate in this context because, as Green-
berg notes: 
No president before him had made such regular, skillful use of this declamatory vehicle, which 
Roosevelt, by naming, fairly invented; no one to that point so acutely discerned or eagerly 
seized the opportunity, afforded simply by being president, to command attention with rous-
ing, morally laden speeches. Roosevelt used speeches about policy and legislation to circum-
vent Congress—to lead from the White House. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 3. In reflecting on the often subjective views of power, political scientist John Gaus observed 
that “how one feels about power depends on whether one has it.” Donald F. Kettl, Public Administration at 
the Millennium: The State of the Field, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. AND THEORY 7, 16 (Jan. 2000). This is certainly 
true for the way presidential control is viewed by citizens and politicians alike who find themselves at various 
times on opposite sides of the argument depending on who’s in office, the issue at hand, or both.  
 4. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The Political Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
(John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) [hereinafter Moe, The Political Presidency]; David E. Lewis, 
Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Agency Competence, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 60, 60–73 (2009); Dan B. Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureau-
cracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 801–28 (1991); Richard W. Waterman, The Administrative Presidency, Uni-
lateral Power, and the Unitary Executive Theory, 39 UNIV. KY. 5, 5–9 (2009).  
 5. See RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983). The term was first used by Rich-
ard Nathan in 1976 in The Public Interest Journal. See Richard P. Nathan, The “Administrative Presi-
dency”, 44 PUB. INT. 40 (1976), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/the-administrative-
 




We also know a great deal about how presidents use their position to frame policy 
goals, set the agenda, and “speak over the heads of Congress” to promote those 
very same goals—referred to as the “Rhetorical Presidency” by Jeffrey Tulis.6 How-
ever, we may be missing important insights about the interplay, or perhaps co-pro-
duction, of these presidential prerogatives because administrative action and rhet-
oric typically are not studied simultaneously. Using the “wicked problem” of climate 
change as it relates to the adoption of federal greenhouse gas regulations under 
the Obama Administration, this article aims to bring these two familiar phenomena 
together to take a fresh look into what they have to say about governance and dem-
ocratic principles.7  
Because of the divisive and often politically charged nature of wicked prob-
lems, they tend to accentuate both the rhetoric and actions surrounding them, and 
few policy problems in the United States rise to the level of climate change in this 
regard. As a result, climate policy offers a helpful window through which to study 
how President Obama utilized administrative and rhetorical strategies and tools to 
pivot away from climate change legislation that had stalled in the Senate in 2009.8 
In particular, the study addresses how Obama rhetorically constructed and ration-
alized his use of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement federal 
climate change regulations via the federal Clean Power Plan.9 Among the insights 
revealed by this analysis are how Obama viewed the role of the bureaucracy, par-
ticularly in an age of tremendous political polarization, how he invoked executive 
power, and what his actions reveal about executive views of democratic institutions 
                                                          
presidency. However, Nathan is commonly cited from his book by the same name published in 1983; thus, 
this author follows the ordinary convention of citing the 1983 work. 
 6. JEFFREY TULIS ET AL., THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 4 (1987). 
 7. See Rittel & Webber, infra note 18. The term “wicked problem” is borrowed from a study 
addressing complex urban planning and infrastructure projects in the 1970s. In the study, the authors dis-
tinguish more ordinary technical or engineering problems from “wicked problems” that by comparison are 
more difficult to resolve because they are value-laden, divisive, expensive, and lack easily identifiable solu-
tions. A number of scholars have used the term in relation to natural resource conflicts, including climate 
change, and it remains an apt descriptor of climate change and climate change policy. See, e.g., Martin Nie, 
The Underappreciated Role of Regulatory Enforcement in Natural Resource Conservation, 41 POL’Y SCI. 139, 
139–64 (June 2008); Mark K. McBeth et al., Buffalo Tales: Interest Group Policy Stories in Greater Yellow-
stone, 43 POL’Y SCI. 391, 391–409 (Dec. 2010).  
 8. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (also called the Waxman-Markey Bill), 
which would have established a federal CO2 cap-and-trade program, passed the House of Representatives 
on June 26, 2009 by a vote of 219-212—the first bill of its kind addressing possible threats from climate 
change passed in either chamber of Congress. See John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of 
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2009), https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20120101085737/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/politics/27cli-
mate.html?_r=1&hp. The bill, however, was not presented in the Senate for either discussion or a vote. In 
the face of insurmountable opposition, including among Democrats, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, a 
Democrat from Nevada, chose not to present the bill to the full Senate. After pulling the bill from consider-
ation, Reid commented, “It’s easy to count to 60. I could do it by the time I was in eighth grade. My point is 
this, we know where we are. We know we don’t have the votes [for a bill capping emissions]. This is a step 
forward.” See Coral Davenport & Darren Samuelsohn, Dems Pull Plug on Climate Bill, POLITICO (July 22, 2010), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2010/07/dems-pull-plug-on-climate-bill-040109. 
 9. Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, E.P.A. Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon Emis-
sions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/climate/clean-power-
plan.html. 
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and norms.10 Understanding such views is particularly relevant since executive ac-
tion tends to be easier to revise than congressional action, leading to a relatively 
less durable and more fluid state of regulatory oversight. Indeed, the Trump admin-
istration is now actively engaged in rescinding and replacing the Clean Power Plan, 
essentially stripping it of its most impactful regulations, through similar unilateral 
actions.11 Again, presidential control is not “owned” or abused by any particular 
political ideology, and this example underscores that control is more about policy 
than it is about party. 
As mentioned, the “administrative presidency” and the “rhetorical presi-
dency” are commonly treated as two separate and distinct areas of scholarship, alt-
hough they are certainly complementary—like two sides of a coin, as some scholars 
have noted.12 However, the two sides may have a compounding influence on one 
another that alters the dynamic of presidential control in important ways. As a re-
sult, it may be more descriptive and helpful to think about the administrative and 
rhetorical presidency as notes on a sheet of music that are arranged and empha-
sized in various ways, at various times, to affect the composition and adoption of 
policy. By viewing the administrative and rhetorical presidency in this way, the pos-
sibility of a more interactive relationship between the two themes of presidential 
control becomes easier to visualize. As this article will demonstrate, adopting this 
perspective and studying the two in concert reveals distinct shifts in rhetoric that 
correspond with and signal Obama’s switch to administrative action. Such shifts are 
at least muted by treating the two strands of scholarship separately. With this in 
mind, it is important to consider that the two combined may very well magnify pres-
idential influence in ways that have been understudied.13 What we see from presi-
dents today seems to be a historically significant amplification of presidential power 
accompanied by a concomitant breakdown in legislative deliberation. Follow-on ef-
fects include deep political polarization along with dramatic swings in policy, which 
act as both positive and negative feedback loops.14 
                                                          
 10. See id. 
 11. See infra notes 26–27. Although executive action via rulemaking allows opportunities to im-
part new interpretations of existing rules, it is a more arduous task because of the stringent requirements 
of the Administrative Procedure Act. See generally CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: 
HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY (CQ Press 4th ed. 2011). 
 12.  Sidney M. Milkis, The Rhetorical and Administrative Presidencies, in RETHINKING THE RHETORICAL 
PRESIDENCY 167, 167–89 (JEFFREY FRIEDMAN & SHTERNA FRIEDMAN eds., 2012). 
 13. ANDREW B. WHITFORD & JEFF YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE PUBLIC AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING 
THE WAR ON DRUGS (2009); see also Milkis, supra note 12.  
 14. See ALAN I. & KYLE L. SAUNDERS, IS POLARIZATION A MYTH? 542–55 (2008); Roger Pielke Jr., Pielke 
on Climate #12, CLIMATE FIX (July 1, 2018), https://theclimatefix.wordpress.com/2018/07/01/pielke-on-cli-
mate-12/. Other scholars argue that deep polarization of the American electorate is generally overstated. 
See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA xiii (2nd ed. 2010) (“Ameri-
cans are closely divided, but we are not deeply divided, and we are closely divided because many of us are 
ambivalent and uncertain, and consequently reluctant to make firm commitments to parties, politicians, or 
policies. We divide evenly in elections or sit them out entirely because we instinctively seek the center while 
the parties and candidates hang out on the extremes.”). For a good discussion of positive and negative 
feedback loops in policymaking, see FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS (2d ed. 2009). 
 




Indeed, as this study reveals, the rhetorical presidency is often used to ration-
alize the use of the administrative presidency, meaning that neither can be exam-
ined separately if we are to understand them fully. By examining these two areas 
of presidential control together as the administrative-rhetorical presidency we gain 
a deeper and richer understanding about the way in which presidents—President 
Obama in this case—wield these powerful policy tools.15 This article serves as a 
starting point for doing just that and proceeds with the following outline. Part I de-
fines the problem addressed by the study and lays the foundation for the central 
research question. In Part II, the article highlights the nature of climate policy in the 
United States, presidential action to address it, and the scholarly foundation and 
framework for the research, including discussions of the administrative and rhetor-
ical presidencies. Part III sets forth the methodology of the study, and Part IV ad-
dresses the research findings. Finally, in Part V, the implications of the study’s find-
ings will be discussed, as well as some concluding thoughts and recommendations 
for follow-up on research. 
II. PART I: DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
In this Part, the article introduces the use of presidential control to address 
the wicked problem of climate change. As will be discussed, presidential control is 
primarily about seeking to control policy outcomes by whatever means necessary. 
While there are a multitude of tools that presidents may utilize to control policies, 
this study is focused on administrative action through executive agencies, some-
times referred to in this article as “the bureaucracy,” and presidential rhetoric. 
These two aspects of control commonly fall under the broader literature of the “Ad-
ministrative Presidency” and the “Rhetorical Presidency,” and their use raises ques-
tions about the proper role of the bureaucracy in policymaking and the ramifica-
tions of the ongoing trend of presidents “going public,”16 which are discussed in 
greater detail in Part II. 
At its most fundamental level, the story of administrative action in the United 
States is a story about the competitive control of its policies.17 While this is certainly 
true for policies that garner little attention outside those who are following them 
closely, it is especially true for high-profile policy problems that are by nature diffi-
cult to resolve, divisive, value laden, and therefore, political in nature. Rittel and 
Webber originally referred to such problems as “wicked,”18 because in contrast to 
strictly technical problems, wicked problems are difficult to define, defy resolution, 
and teem with often conflicting values.19 In their original work, Rittel and Webber 
discussed wicked problems in the context of urban planning.20 However, as is the 
case with certain social policy issues (i.e., abortion, gun control, and immigration), 
                                                          
 15. Milkis, supra note 12. See also WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 13. 
 16. See, e.g., SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP ix (2006).  
 17. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2,245, 2,245–85 (2001).  
 18. Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y 
SCI. 155, 155–69 (1973).  
 19. McBeth et al., supra note 7, at 391–409.  
 20. Rittel & Weber, supra note 18.  
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some environmental policy issues exhibit wicked characteristics. As described by 
Nie, wicked environmental problems are “value-based political conflicts grounded 
in deep core human values.… [Such problems are] acrimonious, symbolic, intracta-
ble, divisive, and expensive.”21 They also defy easy problem definitions and, there-
fore, clearly defined and generally accepted solutions as well. Not surprisingly, then, 
wicked problems are prone to political influences,22 and by logical extension, pres-
idential administrative action, or what Nathan called the “Administrative Presi-
dency.”23 
Such is the case with federal climate change regulations. The focus of this 
study begins during the period when President Obama directed the EPA to imple-
ment the Clean Power Plan, using a relatively novel interpretation of relevant Clean 
Air Act (CAA) statutes.24 The Clean Power Plan followed a series of international 
efforts, executive orders, and policy documents set forth by the Obama Administra-
tion. It was designed to cap CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel electric generating units 
and mandated a 32% reduction in CO2 emissions from 2005 levels by 2030.25 Two 
years later, the Trump Administration directed the EPA to rescind the Clean Power 
Plan, and the agency has now proposed a new rule to replace it with a revised, less 
stringent, and less prescriptive application of the CAA statutes on which it is 
based.26 This “whipsaw” action has implications for industry, environmental and 
economic interests, and the public by creating an uncertain regulatory environ-
ment, governed by special interest lobbying and litigation instead of institutions and 
rules.27 
The federal climate regulation case therefore also has important implications 
for democracy, including how it affects government accountability and responsibil-
ity. If wicked problems can be resolved and modified by administrative action alone, 
                                                          
 21. Martin Nie, Drivers of Natural Resource-Based Political Conflict, 36 POL’Y SCI. 307, 307–08 
(2003).  
 22. McBeth et al., supra note 7, at 392.  
 23. See NATHAN, supra note 5.   
 24. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Emerging New Cooperative Federal-
ism?, 45 PUBLIUS: J. FED. 452, 452–74 (2015); WILLIAM W. HOGAN, ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND THE CLEAN POWER 
PLANT 9–23 (Sept. 21, 2015), https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan_CPP_092115.pdf.  
 25. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. §§ 60, 70, 71, 98 (2015); see also Jeremy M. Tarr, The Clean Air 
Act and Power Sector Carbon Standards: Basics of Section 111(d), DUKE NICHOLAS INST. ENVTL. POL’Y SOLUTIONS 
(Sept. 2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_13-03.pdf; Jeremy 
M. Tarr et al., Energy Efficiency and Greenhouse Gas Limits for Existing Power Plants: Learning from EPA 
Precedent, DUKE NICHOLAS INST. ENVTL. POL’Y SOLUTIONS 3 (June 2013), https://nicholasinsti-
tute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_r_13-04_0.pdf.   
 26. See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. § 60 (2017); Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations, 
40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, 60 (2018). 
 27. Zack Colman, Trump’s Repeal Is Coming. Industry Is Watching the Clock, CLIMATEWIRE (Oct. 5, 
2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060062681/search?keyword=mccabe (quoting Ja-
net McCabe); see also Roger Pielke Jr., supra note 14; Cass R. Sunstein, There’s Little Confusion About 








then why not less wicked, even ordinary problems?28 If administrative action is all 
that is needed, what then is the role of elected officials and the non-elected bu-
reaucracy in making and implementing public policy? A deeply divided public thus 
finds itself on uncertain policy terrain with much at stake, while different admin-
istrations devise and dismantle regulations along party lines. Such actions frustrate 
important policy deliberations, the poignancy of which is felt most when wicked 
problems are involved.29 Of course, climate policy is but one of many wicked prob-
lems subjected to whipsaw positions and unilateral regulatory actions. From foreign 
conflicts to immigration, United States policy is replete with unstable positions that 
seem to change with each election cycle. However, the handling of climate policy 
through administrative rulemaking, which was crafted by one president only to be 
dismantled by the next, provides an instructive window into a policy problem that 
clearly highlights the rationalization of unilateral action through the administrative 
presidency. 
Importantly, the administrative actions of presidents, especially with respect 
to wicked policy problems left unaddressed by affirmative congressional action, 
pose serious questions about the proper role of the bureaucracy in America. As 
originally conceived by Nathan, the administrative presidency relies heavily on the 
belief that the president runs the bureaucracy and should utilize it to implement 
policy preferences.30 In times of political ossification, to modify a phrase from von 
Clausewitz,31 this often means administrative action is merely the continuation of 
legislation by other means—that is, by presidential administrative action through 
the bureaucracy. Of course, the appropriate extent of administrative action has long 
been debated in public administration. A central aspect of the debate is the proper 
role of the bureaucracy in making and shaping policy, especially where competing 
values are in conflict and interest groups seek to influence the decision-making pro-
cess.32 One purpose of this study is to take a closer look at the administrative pres-
idency’s use of the bureaucracy to shape policy on issues for which Congress either 
lacks the appetite or ability to address. 
                                                          
 28. In a sense all organized efforts, whether public or private, seek to command increasing influ-
ence over their various areas of interest. As influence expands so does control, and modern society is fre-
quently defined by its controlling interests and an important question becomes who decides? See THEODORE 
J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 22–41 (1979). 
 29. TULIS ET AL., supra note 6. Tulis argues that under the rhetorical presidency policy is subject to 
frequent change and characterized by a lack of deliberation and “decay of political discourse.” When the 
rhetorical presidency is used to address wicked problems, which are by nature values laden and divisive, 
the public is subject to the divisive rhetoric but remains bereft of deliberation that facilitates resolution. 
Instead, the public is subject to policy swings with each change of political wind. See also Bryan Garsten, The 
Rhetoric Revival in Political Theory, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 159, 159–80 (2011). 
 30. NATHAN, supra note 5.  
 31. The original translation is “war is a mere continuation of policy by [with] other means.” See 
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 121 (Colonel J.J. Graham trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1908). 
 32. See, e.g., Carl J. Friedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility, in 
PUBLIC POL’Y 3, 3–24 (C.J. Friedrich & E.S. Mason eds., 1940); Herman Finer, Administrative Responsibility in 
Democratic Government, 1 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 335, 335–50 (1941); H. George Frederickson, Toward a New 
Public Administration, in TOWARD A NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THE MINNOWBROOK PERSPECTIVE 309–31  (Frank 
Marini ed., 1971); LOWI, supra note 28; Lewis, supra note 4, at 60–73. 
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A primary contribution this article endeavors to make is in the bringing to-
gether of “administrative presidency” scholarship with “rhetorical presidency” 
scholarship in analyzing the EPA and the Clean Power Plan. “Rhetorical presidency” 
scholarship examines how presidents use rhetoric to not only engage the public but 
also to define problems, set the agenda, propose solutions, and indirectly influence 
political actors.33 The term “rhetoric” is used in diverse ways by different scholars,34 
but for the purposes of this article, rhetoric is defined in the classical Aristotelian 
tradition as understanding what is persuasive and using it to convince others under 
a variety of circumstances.35 Yet, the consequences of the rhetorical presidency, 
especially as it is evolving today, extend beyond just the presidential use of rhetoric 
to persuade. 
According to Tulis, a president’s rhetoric concerns the “constitutional order” 
and governance, and it is the vehicle by which contemporary presidents seek to 
influence policy and govern the citizenry.36 Governance in this sense is taken to 
mean a “government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services,” 
as well as where the locus of control lies for such services, whether at the local or 
centrally controlled, federal level.37 The rhetorical presidency thus describes the 
willingness of presidents to bypass Congress and “mobilize the public as a routine 
means of governance.”38 Some scholars, such as Tulis, view this practice as destruc-
tive to American constitutional principles,39 while others see its impact on democ-
racy as ranging from unimportant,40 to harmful.41 Regardless of how scholars have 
come to view it, the study of the rhetorical presidency indicates that it “is, at least 
potentially, a potent force and a significant political resource that needs to be un-
derstood and used wisely.”42 It is important to point out that the potentially potent 
force of the rhetorical presidency described by Stuckey may very well be magnified 
when combined with the administrative presidency, making the admonition to un-
derstand and use it wisely all the more compelling. 
This study lies at the intersection of these three scholarly areas: the wicked 
problem of climate change policy making; the administrative presidency; and the 
                                                          
 33. See TULIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 3–23; see also Paul J. Quirk, When the President Speaks, How 
Do the People Respond?, 19 CRITICAL REV. 427, 427–46 (2007).  
 34. See Garsten, supra note 29; see also David Fleming, Rhetoric as a Course of Study, 61 C. ENG. 
169, 169–91 (1998).  
 35. Christof Rapp, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 4.1 (2010), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/#4.1. 
 36. See Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency in Retrospect, 19 CRITICAL REV. 481, 481–500 
(2007).  
 37. Francis Fukuyama, What is Governance?, 26 GOVERNANCE 347, 347–68, Section Definitions 
(2013).  
 38. MARY STUCKEY, RETHINKING THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY AND PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC, 10 REV. COMM. 
38, 40 (2010). 
 39. See TULIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 145–72; Tulis, supra note 36, at 492–98.  
 40. GEORGE C. EDWARDS, ON DEAF EARS: THE LIMITS OF THE BULLY PULPIT (Yale Univ. Press eds., 2006); 
see also David Zarefsky, Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 607 
(2004).  
 41. Roderick P. Hart, The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age 
210–14 (Chicago: Univ. Press 1987); see Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Trans-
formation of Political Speechmaking (New York: Oxford University Press eds., 1988). 
 42. Stuckey, supra note 38.  
 




rhetorical presidency. Wicked environmental problems have garnered significant 
attention from myriad policy scholars.43 Climate change itself remains a subject of 
substantial import in U.S. policy because of its high salience, entrenched views de-
spite a well-documented scientific consensus, and elusive solutions. The adminis-
trative presidency has been extensively studied over the years by political scientists 
and public policy and administration scholars.44 And the rhetorical presidency has 
been studied by communication scholars and political scientists over the past three 
decades.45 This proposed study aims to bring these different scholarly conversa-
tions together in order to draw some larger conclusions about the current state of 
democratic decision-making. Ideally, the conclusions from this work will contribute 
to themes of significant concern to public administration scholars, such as govern-
ment accountability, responsibility, and democratic principles.46 
With Stuckey’s admonition in clear view—to better understand the “poten-
tially potent force” and “significant political resource” that is the rhetorical presi-
dency—this study begins by asking how President Obama rhetorically constructed 
the role of the EPA, effectively weaponizing it to implement federal climate change 
regulations? Importantly, the way in which presidents rationalize their use of the 
administrative presidency may reveal an evolving view of the bureaucracy in imple-
menting policy, including under what conditions strong executive action is justified 
and whether there are any limits to such action. Such an analysis may also provide 
insights into whether the administrative presidency is simply one tool of executive 
power, or reflects more broadly on how presidents view the bureaucracy. With re-
spect to this last point, as discussed in more detail later, I borrow from political 
scientist Donald Kettl to construct a typology of how presidents view the control of 
government and the role of bureaucracy within it.47 While Kettl proposed a frame-
work rather than a typology, his original theoretical contribution will help root the 
analysis in historical perspectives of governance and provide a theoretical starting 
point for expanding our understanding of both the presidency and bureaucracy.48 
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Ultimately, a better understanding of the “potentially potent force” of a “weapon-
ized” bureaucracy and how presidents view it may help reveal new insights about 
how the use of the bureaucracy to implement presidential policies affects demo-
cratic principles.49 Notably, while rulemakings follow a rigorous review process 
through the Administrative Procedures Act, using the bureaucracy in such a 
weaponized manner creates a mismatch between the seriousness of the policy 
problem and fickleness of the policy response. Such a mismatch may undermine a 
more appropriately deliberative response and foster policies that are driven and 
resolved by populist appeal, as will be discussed later in the article. 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this Part, the article first addresses the concept of climate change as a 
wicked problem in the public policy space and how climate change acts as a marker 
of political ideology. The article then sets forth a theoretical framework that will 
help orient historical ways in which the presidency and bureaucracy have been 
viewed in the scholarly literature. The theoretical framework will be followed by a 
more detailed discussion about presidential control and the two elements of con-
trol—the administrative presidency and rhetorical presidency—that are the focus 
of this article. 
A. Wicked Problems and Presidential Control 
In terms of sheer wickedness, there is perhaps no more wicked problem in 
America than climate change policy. Indeed, climate change is unique in both its 
breadth of impact and depth of discord, joining gun control, taxation, immigration, 
and abortion in the way it hardens the partisan divide and “defines what it means 
to be a Republican or Democrat.”50 Thus, the wicked problem of climate change is 
among a handful of issues that are acutely steeped in partisan politics, where pres-
idential rhetoric sets the tone for how partisans, and opponents, view the prob-
lem.51 Combined with the way in which the underlying contributors of anthropo-
genic climate change are embedded in the institutions, infrastructure, and economy 
of the U.S., such characteristics make climate change policy ripe for presidential in-
fluence and, therefore, an ideal backdrop for studying the administrative and rhe-
torical presidency. 
The way in which climate change is defined and framed as a policy problem 
also contributes to its utility as a focus of the study. For example, who defines the 
problem has important implications as well. As noted by Sarah Pralle, issue salience 
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waxes and wanes with how a problem is defined.52 Issues that are defined as im-
mediate, catastrophic, and proximate will find a higher place on the public and gov-
ernmental agenda than issues that are defined as uncertain, economically expen-
sive, socially undesirable, or occurring in the distant future.53 Not coincidentally, 
this is a dividing line in the climate change debate, which is often characterized, on 
one hand, as the “defining issue of our time” or, on the other, as a “hoax” that is 
too expensive and too uncertain to worry about.54 This dynamic creates positive 
and negative feedback loops, and when combined with crises, or focusing events, 
can lead to either long periods of equilibrium as the status quo is maintained or 
punctuated moments of dramatic change.55 Arguably, climate change policy has ex-
perienced high degrees of both positive and negative feedback loops, yet with little 
change. 
One reason for this, as Nisbet argues, is revealed in recent polling on climate 
change views that reflect a deep polarization of opinions, “resulting in two Americas 
divided along ideological lines.”56 The divide breaks along predictably political lines, 
with Republicans increasingly questioning the certainty of the science of climate 
change and urgency of its effects, while Democrats increasingly endorse climate 
science findings and react with growing concern about possible deleterious effects 
on the environment and society.57 Notably, the partisan divide is unaffected by ed-
ucation or knowledge.58 Roser-Renouf, et al., find that Americans hold a slightly 
more diverse, albeit similarly divided view, of global warming, resulting in six dis-
crete groups they refer to as “Global Warming’s Six Americas.”59 However, despite 
a more refined parsing of views on global warming, their data reflects a similar 
break along the same ideological lines described by Nisbet.60 Thus, when consider-
ing climate change, whether one sees two or six Americas, the conclusion is the 
same: climate change is characterized by deeply divided and firmly held ideological 
views, making it among the most wicked of not only environmental problems but 
social problems as well. It also makes it susceptible to the influences of the party in 
control of the bureaucracy. 
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B. Mapping Presidential Control 
In order to understand how presidents view their authority and the role of 
bureaucracy, it is helpful to place the various views on the matter in historical con-
text. Notably, political control of the bureaucracy is the quintessential element un-
derlying the politics-administration dichotomy.61 While this study does not focus on 
the dichotomy per se, the familiar refrain of its principal arguments certainly echoes 
in the background. From a normative standpoint, an important question is how ac-
tive executives should be in directing administrative agencies to shape public policy, 
especially where Congress has not specifically acted to fill a policy void by statute 
or clarified the implementation standards of how more ambiguous statutes should 
be implemented. In other words, what role should administrative agencies play 
when there is both a legal and policy vacuum? And since presidents direct the ac-
tions of agencies, how proactive should executives be in filling the void of congres-
sional inaction? Perhaps a more fundamental question is how do presidents them-
selves view their use of presidential control? How one views presidential control 
goes a long way in answering these questions and whether value-laden, polarized, 
and unsettled policy problems, like climate change, should be addressed through 
administrative action rather than through a deliberative, congressional process. An-
other important consideration is the sense of urgency, and even opportunity, mo-
tivated by values, priorities, and politics, presidents feel when Congress leaves a 
void that creates space out of which policies can be adopted through administrative 
action. Such occasions grant executives freedom to pursue policies that are contro-
versial and unsettled (i.e. wicked in nature), albeit not without legal, congressional, 
and political challenges. After all, wicked problems like climate change remain 
wicked because of the vigor with which policies addressing them are promoted, de-
fended, and opposed.62 At the same time, presidents will utilize policy voids to pur-
sue their own political and policy ends.  
For example, scholars have long noted, some more approvingly than others, 
that administrative actions via the bureaucracy, as well as the independent actions 
of administrators themselves, are a means to social, economic, and political ends 
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that may or may not reflect broader and more diverse public values.63 As such, it 
matters greatly who does the influencing and how it occurs. As noted by Lewis, us-
ing the bureaucracy to achieve political ends is frequently a factor of either agency 
capture or the influence of interest groups, neither of which tend to be broadly 
representative of the public interest.64 In a similar vein, Lowi describes how the in-
fluence of special interest groups leads to “the atrophy of institutions of popular 
control,”65 which describes what happens when policy becomes untethered from 
“clear standards of implementation,” leaving the priorities of institutions to those 
with the greatest influence over them.66 The same principle holds true for the ex-
ecutive office. Even though the president is formally in control of executive agen-
cies, his views are not necessarily representative of even a majority of the popu-
lace.67 Therefore, whether presidents or special interests control the bureaucracy, 
narrowly defined priorities may frustrate the realization of broader social values. 
These insights are helpful in better understanding the criticism associated 
with unilateral administrative actions that deviate from clear legislative priorities 
and requirements. However, as noted above, legislation is rarely so clear or pre-
scriptive, especially where wicked problems are concerned, leaving executives and 
administrative agencies to set policies or to sort out Congress’s intent through ad-
ministrative rulemaking.68 Naturally, such actions are not universally welcome. And 
one clearly observable result has been an expansion of litigation surrounding 
agency rulemaking and priorities.69 
The Clean Power Plan is representative of such a dynamic, as it has been in 
litigation since the Obama Administration EPA’s final order implementing it in 
2015.70 If the Trump Administration EPA is successful in rescinding and replacing 
the Clean Power Plan, the regulatory landscape will change but the prevalence of 
litigation will not, since those favoring stronger CO2 regulation will subsequently sue 
EPA for weakening it. As this dynamic plays out, EPA’s interpretation of the relevant 
statute and views of its own interpretive discretion, while appearing schizophrenic, 
are merely symptomatic of the climate change policy void coupled with strikingly 
divergent policies of the Obama and Trump administrations.71 In the light of ex-
panding litigation regarding agency rulemaking, numerous scholars have observed 
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that administrative agencies have become “gun-shy and produced an ‘ossified’ 
agency decision-making process that is less flexible, less rational, and less effec-
tive.”72 It is likely this predicament is in some fashion exacerbated by presidential 
control over agency agendas, priorities, and even the rules they promulgate, lead-
ing to more constrained agency action. Some scholars would argue this outcome 
speaks to the need for enhanced agency discretion to more fully represent societal 
values and mitigate negative, or unforeseen, consequences of implemented poli-
cies,73 while others would argue for clearer legislation to limit agency discretion, 
not to mention presidential control.74 
Regardless of the merits of either view of bureaucratic discretion, the fact re-
mains that agencies, as well as presidents, frequently interpret congressional in-
tent.75 Of course, there is typically ample room for interpretation, since it is virtually 
impossible to draft legislation that contemplates all possible future conditions. This 
is particularly true when technology, goals, implementation, future conditions, and 
overlapping tasks (first described as polycentric tasks by philosopher Michael Po-
lanyi)76 cannot be defined, let alone identified, upfront.77 This legislative ambiguity 
may even allow, if not invite, executive action to fill the void, or at least shape it to 
fit their policy preferences.78 Given the prominent role presidents play in this re-
gard, it is helpful to contextualize how they have done so historically. Here, Kettl is 
helpful in sorting out the main ways in which presidents have approached govern-
ance, in particular the way in which they view the bureaucracy as a means for pro-
moting policies. 
Although Kettl developed his framework as a way of categorizing the main 
academic and practitioner views on “administrative ideas and political philosophy” 
(i.e. the politics-administration dichotomy), it also functions well as a typology of 
presidential approaches to the question of the role of bureaucracy.79 As shown in 
Figure 1, the first type is the Madisonian tradition, which maintains that governance 
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is predicated on political power as opposed to administrative efficiency.80 As de-
scribed by Kettl, the Madisonian view is “rich . . . in balance-of-power politics,” 
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Figure 1. Typology of Presidential Control in the U.S.82  
The second type is in the Hamiltonian tradition, which is best characterized by 
the Federalist Alexander Hamilton, who argued that “energy in the executive is a 
leading character of the definition of good government.”83 In other words, Hamil-
tonians are characterized by a strong executive branch actively seeking to serve the 
public interest but “held in check by popular institutions.”84 The third type rests in 
the Jeffersonian tradition, which is characterized by the preservation of individual 
autonomy through grassroots, bottom-up governance that is limited in scope and 
power, and situated at the lowest possible level of government.85 In the Jefferso-
nian tradition, the bureaucracy, if there is any at all, should be as small as possible. 
Finally, no typology of public administration would be complete without the Wilso-
nian tradition. The Wilsonian tradition adheres to the politics-administration di-
chotomy and is characterized by a competent and professional bureaucracy sepa-
rated from the influence of politics.86 In other words, Wilsonians believe in an ac-
countable, technically capable bureaucracy unencumbered by politics and non-
threatening to democracy.87 
To summarize Kettl’s theoretical framework, then, the Hamiltonian and Jef-
fersonian types are contrasted with one another and capture views of government 
hierarchy. Thus, the Hamiltonian type represents a “strong-executive/top-down” 
construct, while the Jeffersonian type represents a “weak executive/bottom-up” 
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construct. The Wilsonian and Madisonian types are contrasted with one another 
and capture the way in which the bureaucracy is viewed respectively as “hierarchy, 
authority, process, and structure” versus “political balance-of-power.”88 Because 
the typology represents the dominant ideas in public administration and govern-
ance since the late nineteenth century,89 it provides a useful way to begin assessing 
how Obama views the respective roles of government and the bureaucracy and, as 
I discuss below, may be used to inform the coding of presidential statements. 
Notably, the role of the bureaucracy in making and shaping policy is a central 
aspect highlighted by the typology, and it is important to keep in mind that the ty-
pology is more than a mere abstraction. On the contrary, each type represents a 
dominant theme in the history of American public administration and governance. 
Which theme is the most appropriate depends on ideological views of the role of 
government as well as more pragmatic views of who’s in charge of it. Thus, it may 
be that ideological purity fades into the shadow of expediency. Ultimately, as de-
scribed by Kettl referencing an argument made by John Gaus, “how one feels about 
power depends on whether one has it.”90 To apply the same sentiment to this study, 
how one feels about administrative action depends on which administration is act-
ing and how such actions are rationalized through presidential rhetoric, making 
both the administrative and rhetorical presidency important concepts for further 
analysis. 
C. Zeroing in on the Administrative and Rhetorical Presidencies 
In this Part, the article looks more closely at the administrative and rhetorical 
aspects of presidential control and more precisely delineates their application by 
various presidents. While the two aspects of control are frequently exercised some-
what independently of one another, their joint use is particularly noteworthy when 
presidential priorities meet congressional resistance. However, regardless of the 
level of resistance to policies, occupants have, without exception, entered the Oval 
Office intent on advancing their favored policies.91 To that end, presidents have 
framed and promoted issues through campaign speeches, press conferences, inau-
gural and State of the Union addresses, and now through the social media venue of 
Twitter.92 By doing so, each president has played an important role in signaling pol-
icy intentions. In the environmental policy arena, there arguably was no president 
more actively engaged in promoting environmental policies than Teddy Roosevelt, 
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who put the power and energy of the president fully behind the conservation move-
ment through his rhetoric and actions.93 Indeed, according to historian Paul Cu-
tright, meaningful strides in the conservation movement were achieved only after 
Roosevelt applied his presidential heft to what he saw as a moral, even religious, 
response to the mismanagement of natural resources.94 In more recent times, pres-
idents have framed issues and employed their powers to both expand and restrict 
environmental regulations, sometimes with the help of Congress but often on their 
own.95 Thus, presidents have played an integral role by word and deed in shaping 
and implementing polices since the inception of the environmental movement and 
will continue to do so in the climate change era as well. 
To illustrate the point, in the modern era, presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy 
Carter, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama used the executive office 
to advance environmental protections, in such diverse areas as the establishment 
of the EPA, energy conservation, acid rain, environmental justice, and greenhouse 
gas reductions.96 On the other hand, presidents Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, 
George W. Bush, and Donald Trump have used the same office to blunt or even 
reverse the actions of prior presidents, punctuated by Reagan’s and Trump’s dereg-
ulatory activities.97 The effort of presidents in this regard has attracted the atten-
tion of scholars interested in both environmental policy and presidential studies, 
although not commonly at the intersection of the two.98 Scholars also have devoted 
considerable effort studying environmental policy disputes, with their highly politi-
cized and polarized nature, conflicting values, and intractable positions.99 
As noted, such problems also are prone to rhetorical influences. While not a 
topic of this study, it bears mentioning that because of the importance of the pres-
ident in agenda setting, presidential rhetoric plays a prominent role in framing 
wicked problems. This is particularly important because the U.S. legislative system 
tends to reinforce the status quo, and implementing policy solutions requires the 
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aid of focusing events, policy entrepreneurs, executive action, or all the above.100 
Such is the context for climate policy and legislative action intended to mitigate 
harmful impacts attributed to a warming planet. Consequently, future policies to 
address such impacts, or maintain the status quo of not addressing them, are influ-
enced and rationalized by the rhetorical presidency and the way in which problems 
and solutions are framed. 
Therefore, unilateral presidential action remains prominently at the heart of 
making and shaping environmental policy.101 For example, from 1970 to 1990 in a 
unique act of bi-partisan cooperation on environmental policy, Congress passed 
nearly every prominent environmental law on which today’s regulations are 
based.102 Since the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, however, 
Congress has had extremely limited success in enacting or amending any nationally 
significant environmental laws, making the unilateral, administrative action of the 
president one of the primary means of implementing environmental reform and 
advancing new policies.103 While some scholars, such as Richard Neustadt and John 
Burke, have pointed out that the fragmented, polarized, and systemic structural 
constraints in the U.S. political system contributes to a weak executive office, pres-
idential studies—especially recent studies—point to growing presidential powers 
through executive management of the bureaucracy and an increasing willingness to 
rely on such power rather than an uncertain legislative process.104 This primarily has 
taken the form of centralizing power in the White House and politicizing the bu-
reaucracy to circumvent an uncertain, and sometimes hostile, legislative process by 
attempting to control policy outcomes through administrative action.105 According 
to Vig, scholars have thus focused presidential studies “increasingly on the rational 
exercise of administrative powers, especially during periods of divided government, 
gridlock in Congress, and national emergency.”106 Of course, seeking to influence 
outcomes and direct policy through the bureaucracy gets at the heart of the admin-
istrative presidency, a subject to which this article now turns in more depth. 
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D. Describing the Administrative Presidency 
As described by Kagan, writing prior to her Supreme Court appointment, 
“[t]he history of the American administrative state is the history of competition 
among different entities for control of its policies.”107 These entities include the 
president, Congress, and the courts, all of which possess potent constitutional pow-
ers that make it unlikely that any single entity will emerge ultimately triumphant, 
although at various points in history each seems to hold sway on important policy 
matters.108 According to Kagan and other scholars, the rise of the administrative 
presidency since the 1970s means the executive office currently enjoys a more 
dominant policymaking position than either Congress or the courts.109 In fact, since 
the initial expansion of presidential powers under President Nixon, executive influ-
ence over administrative agencies has increased with each subsequent presidency, 
leading to increasingly greater influence over policy matters either unilaterally or 
by directing agency activities.110 In addition to the gridlock and divided government 
noted above, scholars have observed that the ongoing shift is due to a number of 
factors, including a deeply divided electorate, an inordinate focus on re-election, 
and Polanyi’s polycentric circles resulting from an increasingly complex political and 
bureaucratic system.111 
In the light of such factors, the expansion of the administrative presidency is 
understandable, especially since presidential success is often defined by presiden-
tial competence in implementing policies.112 Presidents also are concerned with 
their legacies. They want to be “regarded in the eyes of history as strong and effec-
tive leaders” and, in order to succeed, they must exert administrative control over 
policies and priorities to achieve desired outcomes.113 As noted by a number of 
scholars, such demands are overwhelming and actually surpass the power of the 
executive office to realize presidential goals, thus, incentivizing the expansion and 
exertion of power and control over agencies.114 However, while the rise of admin-
istrative presidencies in this context is perhaps predictable, it has neither come eas-
ily nor without controversy. 
From the beginning, presidents have endeavored to shape and control the 
outcomes of administrative agencies.115 Not surprisingly, such endeavors have his-
torically been difficult to accomplish. Presidents through the decades have fre-
quently commented on the difficulty of prompting a recalcitrant bureaucracy to im-
plement presidential will or a resistant Congress to consider policy solutions. In 
speaking of the difficulty of controlling agencies, President Harry Truman is quoted 
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as exclaiming, "I thought I was the president, but when it comes to these bureau-
crats, I can't do a damn thing."116 Similarly, President John F. Kennedy is said to have 
once remarked about a request for administrative action, "I agree with you, but I 
don't know if the government will."117 Similar quotes can be added for Carter, 
Reagan, and others.118 Of course, it is not just the bureaucracy that sometimes frus-
trates presidents. With respect to legislation, one recent example occurred during 
President Obama’s last term, when he eschewed an uncooperative Congress in fa-
vor of executive action predicated on a “We Can’t Wait” policy.119 Again, this mind-
set is neither novel nor uncommon—it extends back to Theodore Roosevelt, who 
argued that presidents have the duty, unless explicitly prohibited by the Constitu-
tion, to take whatever steps necessary to promote the nation’s interest.120 
While presidents have justified their exercise of power, expansion of execu-
tive control has largely occurred at the expense of legislative control.121 Yet, Con-
gress has done little in reaction, despite the many substantive changes enacted by 
presidents in addition to “merely” clarifying policies and priorities.122 As Nathan and 
others argue, the expanding administrative presidency highlights the tension in the 
traditional public administration model of a distinction between politics and admin-
istration.123 Notably, after four years in office, Nixon favored the view that the pres-
ident, as the chief executive, should employ a more managerial approach to agency 
action, undercutting the Wilsonian view of an administration free from the influ-
ence of politics.124 In writing about the administrative presidency, Nathan agrees 
and argues, "[t]he basic premise is that management tasks can and should be per-
formed by partisans. This concept is not only appropriate, but necessary, to a func-
tioning democracy in a large and technologically advanced nation such as the 
United States.”125 For those who hold this view, it is not a question of whether a 
president should intervene in administrative agencies, it is rather a question of how, 
how much, and to what end.126 
In this light, it is interesting to note that ever since its inception, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) purportedly has either been captured by industry 
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or colluded with environmental activists, depending on which party occupies the 
Oval Office.127 Regardless of the veracity of such claims, the view that the EPA is 
weaponized to achieve policy goals reflects the common understanding that natural 
resource agencies in general and the EPA in particular are subject to the policy pri-
orities of whichever presidential administration is in power.128 As Durant argues, 
there is a longstanding practice of using administrative mechanisms for policy im-
plementation by other means as a way for presidents to achieve policy goals in the 
face of recalcitrant political adversaries.129 By way of example, Durant highlights the 
greening of the government (a frame) during the Clinton Administration through 
executive orders and government-wide administrative reform.130 The Obama and 
Trump administrations have taken similar approaches in recent times, albeit from 
different perspectives on the role of government. Perhaps not coincidentally, then, 
presidents Clinton, Obama, and now Trump have employed similar administrative 
tactics after multiple-term presidencies of the opposite party. In the cases of Obama 
and Clinton, the environmental agencies emerged from eight and twelve years, re-
spectively, of significant pressure to limit or constrict environmental regulatory ac-
tivity.131 With new administrations and new priorities more aligned with environ-
mental agency missions, administrative mechanisms became an expedient way of 
implementing previously neglected regulations and policies, especially in the ab-
sence of bipartisan cooperation.132 
In practice, then, the administrative presidency cuts both ways across the po-
litical spectrum and is a common tool among modern presidents. Indeed, history 
has shown and scholars have noted that every modern president since Nixon has 
employed any means necessary to advance his policy goals.133 The relevant point 
being that where roadblocks exist, administrative presidencies will find a way 
around. In fact, as already mentioned, legal ambiguity may even allow, if not alto-
gether invite, executive action to fill the void. As a result, administrative presiden-
cies play an active role in establishing values and priorities, especially when there is 
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no clear direction from Congress, or at times of deep political divide when legisla-
tively addressing an existing void is impossible.134 However, presidents do not just 
act, they rather mobilize the public and set the governmental agenda by signaling 
their intentions to act through formal and informal proclamations through the rhe-
torical presidency.135 In so doing, presidents are able to embark on a process of 
policy change through the rhetorical presidency, whereby they bypass Congress in 
pursuit of political ends.136 As discussed in the following Part, the rhetorical presi-
dency covers the bully pulpit of the executive office. However, the rhetorical presi-
dency is more than just arousing sentiment, setting the agenda, and signaling pri-
orities; it is also mobilizing public support in an effort to displace the less certain, 
less expeditious, and more methodical process of congressional deliberation. 
E. Describing the Rhetorical Presidency 
As originally conceived by Tulis, the rhetorical presidency encompasses the 
way in which presidents use rhetoric to bypass Congress and engage the public to 
define problems, set the agenda, propose solutions, and indirectly influence politi-
cal actors.137 Yet, the rhetorical presidency is much more than just the presidential 
use of rhetoric to persuade; it concerns the “constitutional order” and governance, 
and it is the vehicle by which contemporary presidents seek to influence policy and 
govern the citizenry.138 At its most basic level, it describes the willingness of presi-
dents to bypass Congress and “mobilize the public as a routine means of govern-
ance.”139 
While Tulis’s work formally marks the beginning of the rhetorical presidency 
as a branch of study, Neustadt’s seminal and influential study, Presidential Power, 
is an important beginning point for presidential studies in general. As Skowronek 
points out, the aspirations of the progressive era to create a government with the 
president at the center was complicated by the institutional barriers against sweep-
ing reform.140 Neustadt describes the resulting environment as one where presi-
dents are limited by a constitutional system designed to allow incremental change 
but frustrate sweeping reform.141 Because of this, according to Neustadt, presi-
dents must rely on their personal skills and become adept at bargaining and per-
suasion to successfully meet the often-overinflated public expectations of the of-
fice.142 Echoing Moe’s criticism of Neustadt’s approach, Tulis argues that viewing 
the presidency from the president’s perspective ignores more prevailing institu-
tional factors. Indeed, viewing the presidency “from over the President's shoulder,” 
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as Neustadt does, creates an impression of an institutionally weak executive of-
fice.143 However, presidential studies indicate increasing presidential powers and 
the liberty with which presidents wield them.144 
With this in mind, Skowronek observes that Tulis identifies a trend by modern 
presidents to become policy activists as they “attempt to displace the original con-
stitutional structures that had supported the politics of the past.”145 Under the orig-
inal constitutional order of governance, as Tulis argues, the U.S. Constitution pro-
scribed demagoguery, or popular leadership, and favored deliberation among the 
elected representatives of the people.146 The modern presidency, on the other 
hand, ushered in by the Progressive leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Wood-
row Wilson, placed more energy in the executive by prescribing popular appeals to 
the public, marking the beginning of a “second constitution” under which presi-
dents now govern.147 The effect of the transaction is that presidential appeals to 
the public subvert the original constitutional order, which leads to a decline in policy 
deliberation and ascension of demagoguery.148 
In addressing the state of deliberation, Kernell observes that presidential rhet-
oric, by way of “going public” as a policy strategy, has a destabilizing effect on de-
liberative processes—that is, traditional pluralistic bargaining processes are dis-
carded in favor of insular and unilateral decision making.149 The result of this polit-
ical exchange means policy is made and rationalized by public opinion.150 Scholars 
have mixed views on what this means for democracy. As previously discussed, some 
view this practice as undercutting constitutional principles,151 while others view it 
as inconsequential152 or even expected.153 
However, as Edwards argues, the rhetorical presidency may be more limited 
in its power to persuade than conventional wisdom suggests.154 Edwards finds little 
support in the literature for the power of presidential rhetoric to significantly move 
public opinion.155 Indeed, after examining public opinion polls assessing presiden-
tial actions and approval, as well as legislative initiatives, Edwards finds no systemic 
evidence that presidential rhetoric significantly influences public views on either 
the president or the president’s initiatives.156 However, subsequent studies suggest 
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that presidential rhetoric can be influential in certain respects, such as when presi-
dents go public on congressional appropriations or simply to improve their stand-
ing.157 In any event, while presidential appeals to the public have some effect, it 
may not be the overwhelming influence of the bully pulpit that is frequently as-
sumed, leading some scholars to sound the death knell of the rhetorical presidency. 
Although like Mark Twain, the reports of the rhetorical presidency’s death may be 
greatly exaggerated.158 
While the ongoing debate about the importance and influence of the rhetori-
cal presidency and the propriety of the administrative presidency are beyond the 
scope of this study, the practice of both are unquestioningly relied upon by Obama 
in the context of the CPP. The aim of this study, therefore, is to better understand 
and explicate the way in which Obama rationalizes his use of the administrative 
presidency through the rhetorical presidency. A deeper understanding may reveal 
important insights about how the bureaucracy is viewed from the presidential per-
spective and whether it includes any limits to presidential control. Finally, the study 
strives to uncover insights into whether the administrative presidency is simply a 
tool of the executive or a reflection of a president’s view of the role of the bureau-
cracy. Taken together, the deeper understanding and explication of the potentially 
potent force of a weaponized bureaucracy may help ensure that it is used wisely in 
the preservation, rather than deterioration, of democratic principles. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
This Part of the article discusses the iterative, modified grounded theory ap-
proach used to analyze Obama’s rhetorical presidency. It begins with a brief over-
view of grounded theory and proceeds through how Obama’s statements were se-
lected and analyzed. The research presented here is just one part of a larger re-
search project, which covers presidential speeches, memos, executive orders, and 
agreements, collectively referred to as presidential statements. This article includes 
a smaller subset set of Obama’s speeches, as discussed below. 
Insights from approaches used in qualitative social science and rhetorical anal-
ysis (typically used in the humanities) informed the methodological approach. This 
hybrid approach allowed for the consideration of emergent questions, insights, and 
ongoing assessment of the method of analysis.159 While the administrative presi-
dency, rhetorical presidency, and climate change have been extensively studied 
over the past several decades, this is the first research putting the two ideas to-
gether to analyze the wicked problem of climate change. Although, scholars have 
commented on the need to simultaneously examine the administrative presidency 
and rhetorical presidency as executives continue to entrepreneurially create and 
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enforce public policy.160 The lack of knowledge specific to this area of study makes 
it well suited generally for qualitative analysis and specifically for a modified 
grounded theory approach, whereby the data is analyzed inductively to identify 
emergent themes that are “grounded” in the data, as opposed to being deductively 
verified.161 Such an approach is similar to the approach scholars might take when 
doing discourse analysis. The larger goal of the study was to generate new 
knowledge and form a deeper understanding of how presidents explain and pro-
mote their policy choices and rationalize their use of the administrative presidency. 
An important element of the study, therefore, is the incorporation of rhetorical 
analysis as a system of investigation rather than as a specific methodology.162 As 
such, rhetorical analysis in this study was used to explicate arguments for specific 
policies and rationalizations of administrative action.163 In this manner, Obama’s 
rhetoric was viewed, in the words of rhetoric scholar Martin Medhurst, as “both a 
strategic and a productive art directly related to leadership in public contexts.”164 
The presidential statements analyzed here include Obama’s speeches and 
White House statements from December 2009 through October 2011. Presidential 
statements were selected based on their content explicitly or implicitly related to 
greenhouse gases, climate change, or the Clean Power Plan, as well as related top-
ics, such as energy policy, climate agreements, and executive action when relevant. 
In all, twelve presidential statements were selected for analysis. The statements 
include a diverse range of public addresses covering Obama’s summation of the 
2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen (Copenhagen 
Climate Summit), State of the Union addresses, speeches articulating energy and 
climate policy related to the Waxman-Markey bill, and the Obama administration’s 
pivot to a “We Can’t Wait” campaign in the face of an uncooperative Congress.165 
The speeches were read through multiple times each. The first time through 
was to become familiar with the topic and delivery of each speech, with subsequent 
readings leading to two rounds of coding that were documented in a code book. 
The first, or initial, round involved interacting closely with the data to define and 
label what is “going on” or being expressed in the statements, including what is said 
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and left unsaid.166 The initial coding was essentially a familiarizing process with the 
content of the presidential statements and first step in attaching descriptive char-
acteristics to the data. The second, or focused, round of coding deepened the anal-
ysis by synthesizing and focusing the key analytical direction of initial codes.167 The 
outcome of the second round facilitated the connection of the data to theory and 
opened the way for a deeper and more explicit understanding of the way key rhe-
torical elements are rendered in the data. Finally, during the coding cycles, analytic 
memos were written to capture observations, insights, and reactions to the data 
that served to create the underlying themes in the presidential statements and to 
connect the coding, analysis, and findings portions of the research.168 In other 
words, the analytic memos formed the basis for synthesizing the data and estab-
lished the foundation for building to the findings and outcome of the research.169 
As will be discussed, a number of intriguing codes emerged from this process, 
which were then synthesized within three broad streams of rhetorical theory. The 
data revealed Obama’s evolving and fluid use of rhetorical approaches to defend 
international and domestic action on climate change, promote the Waxman-
Markey bill, and rationalize his use of executive action when the bill was derailed in 
the Senate during the summer of 2010.170 Notably, Obama’s rhetoric took a dra-
matic turn away from a collaborative and, at times, conciliatory tone of unification 
around a common cause, which characterized his pre-Waxman-Markey addresses, 
to one of urgency and increasing stridency as he signaled his “going-it-alone” ap-
proach to policymaking.171 Obama’s rhetoric not only coincided with his shifting 
strategic emphasis—first deliberation, then executive action—but publicly made 
the case for how and why he employed each strategy. As will be argued, such an 
approach places Obama within the Wilsonian tradition of governance, which in-
cludes both Wilson’s views on the relationship between politics and administration 
and his championing of the Progressive Era’s goal of expanding political, social, and 
economic opportunities to a more diverse representation of American citizens by 
bridging “the gap between the promise of American ideals and the performance of 
American political institutions.”172 
 
 
                                                          
 166. CHARMAZ, supra note 161, at 115.  
 167. Id. at 138–40.  
 168. TRACY, supra note 161, at 184.  
 169. JOHN W. CRESWELL, QUALITATIVE INQUIRY AND DESIGN: CHOOSING AMONG 5 APPROACHES (2012); 
JOHNNY SALDAÑA, THE CODING MANUAL FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCHERS (2013). 
170. See infra Part V.C. 
 171. Other scholars have made similar observations about Obama’s earlier speeches, which they 
connected to the themes of community centered on American exceptionalism and the American dream. 
See, e.g., James W. Ceaser, The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism, 1 AM. POL. THOUGHT 3 
(2012); Jason Gilmore et al., Make No Exception, Save One: American Exceptionalism, the American Presi-
dency, and the Age of Obama, 83 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 505 (2016); JONATHAN D. RIEHL, THE NEXT GREAT 
COMMUNICATOR 7 (Nov. 20, 2018), http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_cita-
tion/2/5/6/7/2/pages256720/p256720-1.php; Deborah F. Atwater, Senator Barack Obama: The Rhetoric of 
Hope and the American Dream, 38 J. BLACK STUD. 121, 121 (2007). 
 172. George W. Ruiz, The Ideological Convergence of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, 
19 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 159 (1989).  





Multiple rhetorical categories emerged from the data, indicative of Obama’s 
impressive and diverse array of rhetorical approaches throughout his presidency. 
This study focuses specifically on Obama’s use of polysemy and locus of the irrepa-
rable as the most prominent rhetorical approaches of the speeches analyzed. No-
tably, Obama employs numerous approaches in his speeches and, while they will 
not be analyzed in detail, the various connections to rhetorical theory will be high-
lighted. The following section begins with an overview of what polysemy is in rhe-
torical theory and then progresses with an analysis of Obama’s use of the rhetorical 
approach in promoting his climate policies. Throughout the analysis, the emergent 
codes are contextualized alongside specific quotations that capture the sense in 
which they are used and discussed in relation to how they connect to rhetorical 
theory. The connection to theory is important for understanding how Obama ani-
mates his rhetorical presidency and rationalizes his use of the administrative presi-
dency. The section concludes with a discussion of possible theoretical connections 
to public administration, which serves to synthesize the research findings with 
broader public administration scholarship. 
A. The Rhetorical Use of Polysemy 
As with many of his speeches during the early years of his administration, 
Obama engaged in a form of rhetorical dance as he finessed arguments about clean 
energy and climate change rather than attempting to debunk opposition alto-
gether.173 Obama’s more circumscribed arguments at this time were intended to 
channel attention away from divisive positions and shape perceptions about energy 
policy through his careful framing of policy choices. Obama attempted this maneu-
ver with a careful use of polysemy, especially through strategic ambiguity, to appeal 
to disparate points of view. Polysemy is the concept of attaching different funda-
mental understandings to a single, unifying message.174 Thus, a message that is stra-
tegically ambiguous appeals to multiple understandings originating from diverse 
points of view—dramatically so in the case of climate change—without having to 
resolve, or even address, the inherent differences among them. In other words, the 
message has a little something for everyone and does not require the various inter-
ests to give up firmly held beliefs. 
Obama’s strategic ambiguity can be seen in his appeals to both those advo-
cating swift and significant action against climate change as well as those concerned 
with harmful economic impacts of doing so. The appeal to the disparate interests 
was then wrapped in a patriotic sentiment of American exceptionalism as captured 
in the following excerpt: “Even if you doubt the evidence, providing incentives for 
energy efficiency and clean energy are the right thing to do for our future, because 
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the nation that leads the clean energy economy will be the nation that leads the 
global economy. And America must be that nation.”175 
For good measure, Obama then adds that if all else fails Americans need to 
act on behalf of their children and grandchildren (coded as “Transgenerational 
Trust” as discussed below) to provide them with a safe and secure future.176 In these 
statements, Obama was shaping the attitude of American citizens. As Ivie observes, 
“[a]ttitude was embryonic action,” and Obama rhetorically shapes that attitude in 
order to gain support for his energy and climate policies.177 As he shapes attitudes, 
Obama also recognizes that transforming America’s energy policy would be a long-
term and difficult task. Thus, his motif of a clean energy revolution is tempered with 
a dose of realism as he observes, “Americans also understand that the problems we 
face didn't happen overnight, and so we're not going to solve them all overnight 
either.”178 
B. A Clean Energy Utopia 
Consistent with his circumscribed approach to strategic ambiguity, Obama 
also treats climate change in his early speeches as mostly an afterthought, as if it 
were a minor actor in the “clean energy revolution.”179 In his familiar, easy and con-
trolled manner,180 Obama observes, “...oh, and by the way, [being the leader in 
clean energy] also solves the climate problem.”181 Obama’s casual reference reveals 
a sensitivity to the deep ideological divide of climate change views in the U.S. and 
an understanding that focusing on the divide makes agreement more difficult.182 As 
such, Obama attempts to focus attention on what Americans have in common in 
order to obviate the need to resolve what Americans do not. Thus, prior to the Wax-
man-Markey Bill failing in the Senate, Obama argues that actions to address climate 
change are not simply ideological or climate catastrophism, they are instead prag-
matic.183 They are a path to broader economic prosperity and security that also 
“solves the climate problem.”184 In other words, such actions are “smart” regardless 
of what anyone thinks about climate change and help solidify the argument that a 
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“clean energy economy” will satisfy economic, environmental, social, and intergen-
erational obligations.  
Obama’s strategic ambiguity also incorporates his campaign motif of “hope 
and change,” which is seen in his speech addressing the outcome of the Copenha-
gen Climate Summit.185 By almost all accounts the summit was a dismal failure be-
cause of its lack of substantive agreement.186 However, Obama characterizes the 
outcome in more hopeful terms by noting that it was the “first time in history that 
all of the . . . world’s major economies have come together to accept their respon-
sibility to take action to confront the threat of climate change.”187 Referencing “ex-
tremely difficult and complex negotiations,” Obama concludes that the summit 
would lay the “foundation for international action in the years to come.”188 These 
statements were coded as “Collective Action,” a theme that Obama frequently re-
visits to link U.S. action on climate change with broader international action, with-
out which the efforts of any individual nation would not have an appreciable impact 
on global greenhouse gas emissions or resulting global temperatures.189 In the same 
speech, Obama shifts to a message of opportunity in America where developing a 
“clean energy economy” and leading the clean energy revolution would potentially 
“create millions of new jobs [and] power new industries.”190 Obama also reasons in 
later speeches that “whoever builds a clean energy economy, whoever is at the 
forefront of that, is going to own the twenty-first century global economy.”191 The 
binary nature of collective international action and American dominance continue 
the idea of strategic ambiguity where collaboration and fierce economic competi-
tiveness coexist in the clean energy economy. Such statements became a recurring 
theme for Obama and also indicate a strategic use of utopian rhetoric—coded as 
“Clean Energy Utopia”—to make an economic, nationalistic, and ultimately prag-
matic argument, as discussed below, for transitioning to low-carbon energy.  
In a broader context, the theme invokes patriotic, American traditions linked 
to the founding of the nation where unity is emphasized over diversity.192 This em-
phasis is a continuation of Obama’s campaign speeches where he de-emphasized 
the differences among Americans and instead argued that their core identity is 
simply that of being an American.193 Such an emphasis on unity supports Obama’s 
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argument that there are many compelling economic, environmental, and social rea-
sons to adopt a clean energy economy where all interests are better off than the 
status quo. As Obama reasons during an interview with Jim Lehrer on PBS’s The 
News Hour, there is much work to be done in the area of climate policy, but adds, 
“my main responsibility here is to convince the American people that it is smart 
economics and it is going to be the engine of our economic growth for us to be a 
leader in clean energy.”194 These types of statements were coded as “Voice of Rea-
son” because they reflect a view that recognizes the difficulty of the task ahead but 
sees clearly through the inherent complexity and conflict of climate policy toward 
a rational solution where everyone benefits. Obama is essentially standing above 
the fray pointing the way to the “smart” and inevitable expansion of a clean energy 
economy. 
In carrying his polysemous message to the American public, Obama articulates 
his version of the American Dream, framed in this case by a clean energy revolution 
that emphasizes community over individualism.195 The communal responsibility is 
expressed by governmental action to set in motion a clean energy economy that 
will help people, including the children, realize their own American dream.196 And 
by being the “Voice of Reason,” Obama makes a rational, yet inspirational, appeal 
for the “smart choice” that will improve economic conditions, protect the children, 
and solve the climate crisis.197 Such an approach has been characterized as the pro-
cess of “persuading through reason, and motivating through emotion.”198 It is also 
embryonic action that Obama intends to translate into policy action by making stra-
tegically ambiguous appeals to diverse interests. 
C. The Rhetorical Use of Locus of the Irreparable 
Once the Waxman-Markey Bill stalled in the Senate during the summer of 
2010, Obama’s rhetoric takes a noticeable turn that signals a pivot away from leg-
islation and toward administrative action. One gets an early glimpse of where 
Obama is headed when he offers support of the Waxman-Markey Bill and the Sen-
ate’s rejection of Senator Murkowski’s amendment to prohibit EPA from regulating 
CO2 as a pollutant, along with other greenhouse gases from stationary sources.199 
The noteworthy aspect of Obama’s statement is his emphasis on the distinction be-
tween progress toward a “clean energy economy,” a direction that will also protect 
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the children, and regressing “backward to the same failed policies that have left our 
Nation increasingly dependent on foreign oil.”200 As a result, Obama’s message 
clearly highlights a choice between, on the one hand, safety, security, and prosper-
ity and, on the other hand, a society stuck in reverse, clinging to its coal and oil. At 
this stage, the Waxman-Markey Bill was floundering in the Senate, and Obama was 
being roundly criticized by the environmental community for not taking a stronger 
position on climate change, with Rolling Stone even accusing Obama of “lead[ing] 
from behind on climate change.”201 
In the spring of 2011, Obama began to signal a new policy direction at a Dem-
ocratic National Convention fundraiser in San Francisco.202 In that address, Obama 
strikes a tone of increasing impatience and urgency, stating: 
There are climate change deniers in Congress, and when the economy gets 
tough, sometimes environmental issues drop from people's radar screens. 
But I don't think there's any doubt that unless we are able to move forward 
in a serious way on clean energy that we're putting our children and our 
grandchildren at risk.203 
By the time Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly in Sep-
tember 2011, he had turned his attention from Congress to the international com-
munity and unilateral executive action.204 For example, in his speech to the United 
Nations, Obama declares: 
To preserve our planet, we must not put off action that climate change 
demands. We have to tap the power of science to save those resources 
that are scarce. And together, we must continue our work to build on the 
progress made in Copenhagen and Cancun, so that all the major econo-
mies here today follow through on the commitments that were made. To-
gether, we must work to transform the energy that powers our economies 
and support others as they move down that path. That is what our com-
mitment to the next generation demands.205 
In this short paragraph, Obama reiterates in summary fashion a number of the 
statements he made beginning in 2009. These statements were coded as “We Can’t 
Wait,” “All of the Above Energy,” “Collective Action,” and “Transgenerational 
Trust.” As discussed above, the “Collective Action” code captures the idea that con-
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sequential action addressing climate change requires the collective effort of all na-
tions acting together, while “All of the Above” underscores the idea that all forms 
of energy are on the table thus attempting to assuage the economic and energy 
security concerns of those invested in traditional energy sources. The “We Can’t 
Wait” code captures the sense that the time to act is now, and delay will bring the 
world to a point of no return at which climate catastrophism is inevitable.  
Such appeals can be grouped under a general rhetorical appeal to the “locus 
of the irreparable.”206 The use of locus of the irreparable in rhetoric seeks to moti-
vate those less willing to act with requisite urgency, as well as to convert those who 
are less committed to a no action alternative.207 Just as there are diverse views 
about climate policy, there are equally diverse views about how urgently action 
should be taken on those policies.208 Of those interested in the policies, some will 
be motivated to take immediate action, while others will be less committed.209 Of 
those less committed, some will be interested but not quite ready to commit to 
action.210 Still others, while not holding opposing views, will be more or less ambiv-
alent.211 Taken together, this large group of the public requires a compelling reason 
to get behind urgent action.212 Obama’s appeal in the “We Can’t Wait” campaign is 
directed at this large group and the locus of the irreparable is his rhetorical ap-
proach to winning them over. The locus of the irreparable captures the idea that 
not acting now means foreclosing the opportunity to act in the future.213 In this 
case, Obama is arguing that the consequences of not acting now through a clean 
energy economy lead to a future where actions will no longer be effective.  It will 
be too late to secure a bright economic future for America and safety for the chil-
dren.  
Locus of the irreparable also captures the notion that what is lost cannot be 
replaced.214 Accordingly, it speaks to the uniqueness of what is lost and demands 
exceptional action to ensure it persists.215 This, of course, echoes the precautionary 
principle but in a more urgent way because it suggests that the outcome is definite 
and promises that it cannot be reversed.216 The locus of the irreparable also implies 
that a limit is fast approaching and highlights the precarious nature of the situation, 
which demands immediate action.217 Yet, despite the urgency, there is hope that 
what is threatened need not be lost and can be preserved by an “agent’s active 
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intervention to ensure its continued existence.”218 Finally, the locus of the irrepara-
ble frames the issue in such a way that it focuses attention on the objects of shared 
agreement, rather than those of disagreement, and places society in a position of 
looking beyond itself at two future possibilities separated by one fateful action.219 
In the spring of 2011, Obama began employing the locus of the irreparable to 
signal a full pivot to administrative action in the face of an uncooperative Congress. 
As noted above, Obama was growing increasingly impatient and he underscored 
the need for immediate action by calling out members of Congress who were no 
longer focused on climate policy.220 
Then, in introducing his “We Can’t Wait” campaign, Obama makes a stark shift 
in both style and substance by proclaiming, “We can’t wait for an increasingly dys-
functional Congress to do its job. Where they won’t act, I will.”221 In his speech, 
which was focused on jobs and the economy but alluded to other policies as well, 
Obama embraces a level of stridency and unilateral action that were absent in ear-
lier speeches when he struck a more collaborative, even conciliatory, tone with Con-
gress and the American people.  Obama did not completely pull back from Congress, 
rather he offered an alternative path that he was willing to pursue should Congress 
continue to ignore his policies. However, Obama was clear about his intent should 
Congress not do what he called “the right thing” when he proclaimed: 
But we can't wait for that action. I'm not going to wait for it. So I'm going 
to keep on taking this message across the country. Where we don't have 
to wait for Congress, we're just going to go ahead and act on our own. And 
we're going to keep on putting pressure on Congress to do the right thing 
for families all across the country.222 
In addition to “We Can’t Wait,” these statements were coded as “Going it 
Alone” to capture the idea that Obama was focused on administrative action as 
much as, if not more, than legislative action. Indeed, over the course of the next 
year, the Obama administration produced no less than forty-five distinct executive 
actions, ranging from executive orders and presidential memos to recess appoint-
ments and waivers.223 With respect to climate change, Obama had already begun 
to work through the EPA to achieve the goals of the Waxman-Markey Bill and 
emerging international climate agreements. While Obama’s plan for executive ac-
tion on climate change would not be revealed until June of 2013, the Obama ad-
ministration was already laying the groundwork for the release of “the President’s 
Climate Action Plan” and a related presidential memo directing the EPA to regulate 
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CO2 emissions from the power sector.224 The EPA issued its regulations to do so 
under the Clean Power Plan.225 
Also worthy of note is that with his rhetorical shift, Obama was now “speaking 
over the heads of Congress” to appeal directly to and motivate the American people 
reasoning, “And that's why [we] need all of . . . [these major voices]. Tell Congress 
to stop playing politics and start taking action on jobs.”226 This statement was coded 
as “Populist Appeals” to capture direct appeals to the public to intervene in the 
policymaking process. The line seems fairly standard for a president attempting to 
get Congress to budge on a gridlocked policy. However, it becomes a more populist 
overture when Obama sets up Congress as the foil for not doing “the right thing” of 
passing legislation that would otherwise help the American people.227 Such an ap-
proach is consistent with the way in which Tulis envisions the rhetorical presidency 
functioning when policies fail to gain traction in Congress.228 Whether populist or 
not, Obama’s combined use of the rhetorical and administrative presidency moved 
the executive branch closer to what has been described as an “executive party sys-
tem” that appeals to partisan support as it adopts partisan policies.229 Perhaps more 
profoundly, in light of Trump’s actions to unravel the Clean Power Plan, the combi-
nation advances a new paradigm where unilateral action becomes the “habitual so-
lution to partisan polarization.”230 
D. Connections to Administrative Theory 
Hearkening back to Kettl’s typology, partisan appeals are consistent with the 
Wilsonian view of governance, especially with respect to how presidents view the 
role of the bureaucracy in implementing policy. Wilson’s articulation of the politics-
administration dichotomy was a reaction against partisan politics implemented 
through political patronage, a view that is consistent with the original meaning of 
the dichotomy advocated by the civil service reformers of the late 1800s.231 In this 
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view, free from “politics” means free from partisan, electoral politics, not the poli-
cies that are a natural outgrowth of democratic outcomes.232 In other words, Wilson 
and the reformers envisioned a bureaucracy free from the influence of “boss”-led, 
partisan politics operating from a posture of neutral competence, while recognizing 
that genuine neutral competence means "loyalty that argues back.”233 Viewed in 
this light, the dichotomy never envisioned an administration devoid of politics or 
policymaking.234 In fact, as expressed by Wilson, “Our own politics must be the 
touchstone for all theories. The principles on which to base a science of administra-
tion for America must be principles which have democratic policy very much at 
heart.”235 Thus, a Wilsonian understanding of the politics-administration dichotomy 
is one in which administrative agencies grapple with vexing policy choices set forth 
by political leaders. Of course, this means that rather than partisan “bosses” direct-
ing extra-constitutional institutions, such policy choices would instead be the prior-
ities of an acting president, as principle, expressed through the actions of adminis-
trative agencies, as agent.236 In announcing his “We Can’t Wait” policy of adminis-
trative action, Obama was simply following a model of governance in the Wilsonian 
tradition as he pivoted to administrative action via the EPA. 
In further support of this conclusion, Woodrow Wilson theorized as much 
about presidential rhetoric as he did administrative action.237 As expressed by Wil-
son, “Policy—where there is no absolute an arbitrary ruler to do the choosing for a 
whole people—means massed opinion, and the forming of the mass is the whole 
are and mastery of politics.”238 In other words, rather than being the handmaiden 
of public opinion, the rhetorical presidency was instead the mechanism by which 
public opinion would be both formed and informed. Such an approach would nec-
essarily involve fathoming the will of the people, which may only be vaguely known 
to them, and interpreting that opinion in order to inform public policy and, in the 
case of this study, rationalize unilateral executive action.239 The rhetorical president 
would then educate and persuade the populace by connecting public desire with 
public policy.240 This is precisely the approach that Obama took when he observed: 
[M]ost Americans also understand that the problems we face didn't hap-
pen overnight, and so we're not going to solve them all overnight either. 
What people don't understand though is why some elected officials in 
Washington don't seem to . . . share the same sense of urgency that people 
all around the country [share].241 
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Then, connecting his interpreted sense of public opinion and expressing it as 
both executive action and public mobilization, Obama concluded: 
But we can't wait for that action. I'm not going to wait for it. So I'm going 
to keep on taking this message across the country. Where we don't have 
to wait for Congress, we're just going to go ahead and act on our own. And 
we're going to keep on putting pressure on Congress to do the right thing 
for families all across the country. And I am confident that the American 
people want to see action. We know what to do. The question is whether 
we're going to have the political will to do it.242 
Thus, with the “We Can’t Wait” campaign, we see Obama in the Wilsonian 
tradition educating, informing, and mobilizing the support of the populace by rhe-
torically rationalizing his administrative pivot. The force behind this dual action of 
rhetoric and policy is an executive party system that readily moves forward when 
Congress stands pat. The effect of which is a governance determined by party, es-
pecially where highly politicized issues are concerned. This is not to say that such 
governance is improper. The post-New Deal application of the administrative state 
to make and interpret rules in lieu of Congressional action has been widely sup-
ported by both scholars and the courts.243 Indeed, practical considerations, such as 
time and expertise, require administrative agencies to promulgate rules that would 
ordinarily cripple Congress.244 Further, administrative action, while at times favor-
ing narrow interests, also serves national interests.245 
However, it does mean increasingly partisan governance characterized by an 
expanding gap between deliberation about national priorities and the adoption of 
rules reflecting more partisan views about those policies. Meanwhile, that gap rep-
resents a hardening of political differences that becomes the justification for exec-
utive action. In this case, rather than signaling new rounds of negotiation, the break-
down in deliberation signaled legislation by other means—that is, administrative 
action as the “habitual solution to partisan polarization.” Thus, the interaction of 
the policy captured by the pivot and the corresponding political language rational-
izing it combine to create a reciprocal relationship that, as described by Stuckey, “is 
capable of reconstituting the reality in which those things are embedded.”246 And 
that reality has become one in which presidents are justified in taking unilateral 
action when the partisan divide is too wide for Congress to cross. 
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This study began with a focus on better understanding and explicating the way 
in which President Obama rationalized his use of the administrative presidency 
through the rhetorical presidency. The study endeavored to uncover how Obama 
viewed the bureaucracy, especially with respect to whether any limits remain to 
presidential control over it, and whether the administrative presidency was simply 
an expedient tool in the hands of an entrepreneurial president or a reflection of 
that president’s view of governance. Clearly, Obama viewed the EPA as an expedi-
ent way to move climate policy that he would have preferred to enact through Con-
gress. In other words, administrative action to Obama was simply legislation by 
other means, and he used what he characterized as the looming and irreversible 
impacts of climate change and economic loss as justification for not only speaking 
over the heads of Congress but bypassing it altogether. However, in addition to the 
pragmatic leveraging of administrative action, there are a number of telling obser-
vations that can be drawn from the findings. 
First, by pivoting to executive action Obama was continuing a well-preserved 
presidential tradition of implementing policy by any means necessary. Yet, merely 
continuing the tradition is a far less compelling observation than the way in which 
he continued it. Indeed, Obama’s approach draws fascinating parallels with Wood-
row Wilson’s progressive philosophy. Wilson saw the office of the president as a 
unifying force—both the leader of the nation and the leader of his party.247 As such, 
Wilson not only saw his role as leading the nation, but also as shaping national views 
to reflect his own.248 Obama assumed a similar view of his role as president and 
attempted to shape national views on climate policy while Congress deliberated the 
Waxman-Markey bill. However, as a reformer in the Wilsonian tradition, Obama 
readily adapted to a disinterested Congress, and largely unmotivated public, by ad-
dressing an urgent problem on his own that was predictably interpreted as an indi-
rect attack on the customs and conventions of democratic principles. 249 And we 
now see the “counterattack” as an opposing party undoes executive action by ex-
ecutive action. 
The swing of this political pendulum leads to the second observation, which 
confirms what others have observed as a system of policy formulation and adoption 
achieved through an executive party system.250 If all policy is now partisan policy, 
then deliberation is now an anachronism or, at best, something that should be at-
tempted but not favored. Accordingly, unilateral action is justified whenever Con-
gress ignores, ineffectively addresses, or altogether opposes presidential overtures. 
It is in this space where the interaction of the administrative presidency and the 
rhetorical presidency become particularly profound. That is, when administrative 
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action becomes the default means by which policy is formulated, adopted, imple-
mented, and defended, then a president’s rhetoric may serve to harden the divide 
rather than unify the populace. Thus, unlike the progressive era ideals, populist ap-
peals are in reality partisan appeals, while rhetoric is weaponized, along with the 
bureaucracy, to gain and exploit any advantage to keep and wield power. This is the 
demagoguery our Founding Fathers were concerned about, and it is the demagogu-
ery we may now face as the administrative presidency and rhetorical presidency 
become business as usual. At this juncture, Congress has the means but not the will 
to address the very manifestation of what the Founding Fathers feared. The result 
of which ultimately means that wicked policy problems will remain unsettled and 
national interests will suffer from the absence of robust deliberation. 
Finally, it would be a mistake to conclude that Obama’s rhetoric was in any 
way ineffectual. Notwithstanding whatever manifestations Obama’s rhetorical 
presidency has on future presidencies and democratic principles, his rhetoric at 
least signaled a policy direction that, even though it fell short of implementation, 
likely influenced future energy decisions.251 Indeed, while the Clean Power Plan was 
never implemented, its CO2 reduction goals remain on target due to a combination 
of policy, market, and regulatory forces.252 What has been understudied is the de-
gree to which the threat of policy action motivated the electricity industry to begin 
to move away from coal. While it is well publicized that states are increasingly tak-
ing action to reduce CO2 emissions, less publicized is the fact that major electric 
utilities that have traditionally relied upon coal-fired generation are making similar 
decisions.253 Policy, market, shareholder, and regulatory factors certainly combined 
to influence these low-carbon moves, but it is also likely that such moves were 
made in anticipation of future CO2 regulation, which Obama ultimately may be re-
sponsible for ushering in rhetorically, if not administratively. If that is the case, then 
the administrative and rhetorical presidencies must be viewed simultaneously if we 
are to understand them fully. 
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